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CLD-159        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-3581 
 ___________ 
 
 FREDDY AGUILERA QUINJANO, 




WARDEN HOWARD HUFFORD;  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 3:11-cv-02254) 
 District Judge:  Honorable James M. Munley 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 14, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 







 Freddy Aguilera Quinjano, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court‟s 
order denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons that 
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follow, we will summarily affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss the background of this case 
only to the extent needed to resolve this appeal.  Quinjano is a federal prisoner 
incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at Schuylkill in Minersville, 
Pennsylvania.  In 1988, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida (hereinafter “SDFL”) sentenced him to thirty years‟ imprisonment for possession 
and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.  Between 1989 and 1997, three other federal 
district courts sentenced him to prison time for various drug-related offenses.  The most 
recent of those sentences, imposed by the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania (hereinafter “the District Court”), is a life term (without parole) 
for violations of § 846 and the federal aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2. 
 In 2011, Quinjano commenced this action by filing a pro se habeas petition in the 
District Court pursuant to § 2241.  The petition essentially took issue with the fact that 
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) was treating his SDFL sentence as a non-parolable 
sentence.  According to Quinjano, because his SDFL offenses were committed before the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) went into effect on November 1, 1987,1 he was 
eligible for parole from his SDFL sentence.   
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 After the Government filed its opposition to the petition, the United States 
Magistrate Judge who was assigned to the case issued a report recommending that the 
District Court deny the petition on the merits.  Quinjano subsequently filed objections to 
the report.  On August 29, 2012, the District Court overruled those objections, adopted 
the Magistrate Judge‟s recommendation, and denied the petition.  This appeal followed.    
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).
2
  
We review the District Court‟s denial of habeas relief de novo, exercising plenary review 
over the court‟s legal conclusions and reviewing its findings of fact for clear error.  See 
Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).  We “may affirm the District 
Court‟s judgment on any basis supported by the record.”  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 
246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 Having carefully considered Quinjano‟s arguments, we agree with the District 
Court‟s decision to deny his request for habeas relief.  First, as the District Court 
highlighted, there is no evidence that the BOP treated his SDFL sentence as one imposed 
under the SRA.  Second, he has not established that the BOP erred by failing to treat that 
sentence as being subject to parole.  It appears that his SDFL offenses may have been 
                                                                                                                                                             
1
 The SRA replaced “indeterminate sentences and the possibility of parole with 
determinate sentencing and no parole.”  Lyons v. Mendez, 303 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 
2002) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
2
 Quinjano does not need to obtain a certificate of appealability to proceed with this 
appeal.  See United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), 
abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012). 
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committed after the effective date of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (“ADAA”), 
which, inter alia, amended 21 U.S.C. § 841 such that “„no person sentenced under  
[§ 841(b)(1)(A)] shall be eligible for parole during the term of imprisonment imposed 
therein.‟”  United States v. Marisio-Gonzalez, 46 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1995) (per 
curiam) (quoting section 1002 of the ADAA).  Even if his SDFL offenses predated the 
effective date of the ADAA, he is still ineligible for release on parole in light of the life 
sentence imposed against him by the District Court in 1997.
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 Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court‟s judgment.  See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
                                                 
3
 Quinjano‟s habeas petition, perhaps conveniently, failed to mention his life sentence.   
